Translator Disclaimer
1 July 2009 Assortment and the Evolution of Generalized Reciprocity
Author Affiliations +
Abstract

Reciprocity is often invoked to explain cooperation. Reciprocity is cognitively demanding, and both direct and indirect reciprocity require that individuals store information about the propensity of their partners to cooperate. By contrast, generalized reciprocity, wherein individuals help on the condition that they received help previously, only relies on whether an individual received help in a previous encounter. Such anonymous information makes generalized reciprocity hard to evolve in a well-mixed population, as the strategy will lose out to pure defectors. Here we analyze a model for the evolution of generalized reciprocity, incorporating assortment of encounters, to investigate the conditions under which it will evolve. We show that, in a well-mixed population, generalized reciprocity cannot evolve. However, incorporating assortment of encounters can favor the evolution of generalized reciprocity in which indiscriminate cooperation and defection are both unstable. We show that generalized reciprocity can evolve under both the prisoner's dilemma and the snowdrift game.

© 2009 The Society for the Study of Evolution.
Daniel J. Rankin and Michael Taborsky "Assortment and the Evolution of Generalized Reciprocity," Evolution 63(7), 1913-1922, (1 July 2009). https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1558-5646.2009.00656.x
Received: 20 April 2008; Accepted: 1 January 2009; Published: 1 July 2009
JOURNAL ARTICLE
10 PAGES

This article is only available to subscribers.
It is not available for individual sale.
+ SAVE TO MY LIBRARY

SHARE
ARTICLE IMPACT
RIGHTS & PERMISSIONS
Get copyright permission
Back to Top