Translator Disclaimer
17 November 2014 Cap-and-Trade Bycatch Management with Costly Avoidance and Stock Uncertainty
Author Affiliations +
Abstract

Regulations to reduce bycatch of non-marketed marine species often impose gear restrictions, reductions in harvest of the target species, and/or spatial and temporal closures of the fishing ground. These regulations can exact significant social costs in commercial fisheries. We evaluate performance of a cap-and-trade bycatch management policy. Harvest of a target fish species, costly avoidance of the bycatch species, and harvesting efficiency are examined in a stochastic production environment with and without at-sea observability of bycatch, and with and without trade in harvest quotas and bycatch caps. Our results suggest that precise implementation of a socially optimal management plan is possible only if bycatch is observable and trade in fish quotas and bycatch cap is frictionless. Conditions exist in which quota/permit trading raises bycatch relative to a no-trade environment. The results offer useful guidance for designing cap-and-trade bycatch management programs.

JEL Code: Q2.

© 2014 by MRE Foundation, Inc. All rights reserved.
Rajesh Singh and Quinn Weninger "Cap-and-Trade Bycatch Management with Costly Avoidance and Stock Uncertainty," Marine Resource Economics 30(1), (17 November 2014). https://doi.org/10.1086/679461
Received: 10 February 2014; Accepted: 1 August 2014; Published: 17 November 2014
JOURNAL ARTICLE
23 PAGES

This article is only available to subscribers.
It is not available for individual sale.
+ SAVE TO MY LIBRARY

SHARE
ARTICLE IMPACT
RIGHTS & PERMISSIONS
Get copyright permission
Back to Top