Author Kevin C. Elliot, an associate professor of philosophy at the University of South Carolina, is interested in how the philosophy of science and practical ethics interconnect and how they are involved in controversial research topics in contemporary pollution research that are relevant to public policy. His book, Is a Little Pollution Good for You? Incorporating Societal Values in Environmental Research, follows his philosophical leanings. The primary purpose of this volume is to improve the analysis of methodological and interpretive judgments of hormesis, which “consists of instances in which the direction of some biological response (e.g., growth, disease incidence, enzyme activity) changes with decreasing dose [of a toxin] as a result of biological feedback mechanisms” (p. 18). A secondary objective is to espouse a transdisciplinary synthesis involving social value, ethics, economic and political interests, and the general public.
I find the chosen title unfortunate, because special-interest groups will almost certainly use it to further weaken federal and state regulations on pollution controls. The author recognizes the serious problem that “powerful stakeholders with deep pockets can pursue a variety of strategies to obtain research results that serve their interests in policy-relevant cases like hormesis” (p. 189). A handful of scientists (and many nonscientists) have obscured the truth about tobacco smoke and global warming (Oreskes and Conway 2010), although the preponderance of scientific evidence supports the assertion that tobacco smoke and anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions are harmful. Consequently, the general public is still doubtful, as are its political representatives. The evidence for hormesis is far less robust, because “interpreting the significance of hormesis for even a single species in an ecological risk assessment can be complicated by competition with other species, predation effects, etc. In addition, ecological risk assessments may involve communities of hundreds or thousands of species as well as a range of ecological processes” (Gentile and van der Schalie 2000, p. 227).
The most serious deficiency with hormesis is the lack of research on its effects at higher levels of biological organization (e.g., communities, ecosystems). A second deficiency is that increased environmental realism in test conditions increases the difficulty of replication, which then becomes a serious problem for statistical analysis. In addition, the validation of laboratory test results would be more persuasive if long-term monitoring of natural systems were to identify responses not merely evident at the single-species level. If I were performing an opportunity—cost analysis on the distribution of research funding for environmental studies, tipping-point studies would be assigned a high priority, and hormesis would be assigned a low priority on the list. When a tipping point is passed, irreversible change occurs in an ecological or societal system. Moreover, tipping-point thresholds can only be determined in retrospect. The case for hormesis is much weaker; it typically involves individuals of relatively few species, whereas tipping points occur in large systems, both ecological and societal, and are fairly robust.
Although special-interest science is covered briefly in this volume, as are financial conflicts of interest in the related scientific debates, no substantive attention is given to the successful attempts of individuals who have few or no scientific credentials to cast doubt on scientific evidence. The notorious “Climategate” scandal involved a few pirated personal e-mails out of thousands. Two or three of these e-mails were injudicious, and they were not, by any stretch of the imagination, from peer-reviewed publications. Yet the news media treated the event as a scandal, and so did the general public. An equally valuable example concerning dioxin exposure is given on page 132 of Is a Little Pollution Good for You?, but when a threat of libel arose in this case, the media coverage dried up. Most scientists, especially those with substantial research programs, simply lack the time and inclination to remain involved in such situations; at the very least, their research would suffer. Although I especially enjoyed the sections of the book on ethics and value judgments and those on safeguarding science (the coverage of Edward Calabrese's research and publications is superb), I would have liked more coverage on the central issue of coping with special-interest groups, because they are questioning both the integrity of scientists and that of their evidence.
The discussion of ethics for experts is especially well done, but what is left unanswered is this: How can scientists and the general public deal with unethical “experts” who often lack any scientific credentials when the news media give them equal or more time?
As the author notes, Calabrese has made a major contribution by acknowledging “that hormetic effects may often be harmful rather than beneficial” (p. 152). Reasonable people would applaud such action, but imagine how unscrupulous opponents of hormesis would use such an ethical and appropriate statement. Ideally, objective analyses should include all options and should include a risk-benefit analysis. Most people want to believe that what they are drinking, eating, breathing, or doing is “safe,” but US government regulations are viewed with suspicion, and funds for regulators have been reduced. This problem could be eliminated by having a single standard of risk—for all sources of electricity, for example. Certain levels of risk would be prohibited by federal law. However, the question of scientific advocacy (p. 184) is certain to arise on issues in which the precautionary principle is invoked; namely, action is justified even when the evidence available at the time is not robust if the consequences of inaction are likely to be catastrophic. Would informed consent (p. 137) be as appropriate for environmental risks and benefits as it is in biomedical ethics, especially when intergenerational ethics are involved?
Elliot has covered a broad range of literature on hormesis and related fields but primarily at a single-species (Homo sapiens) level. The word pollution in the title (suggesting hormesis) deserves scrutiny at higher levels of biological organization—even though the value of this concept is not clearly shown. I applaud the author's efforts to bring about consilience (literally “leaping together”) between societal values and policy-relevant environmental research. However, synthesis requires a great deal of time, and its importance is difficult to communicate to the news media and the general public, since, at present, environmental literacy in both groups is inadequate to address a complex subject such as hormesis. Knowing about the problem is a superb first step, but it is not enough.
