Gao, H.; Cao, G., and Xing, D., 2019. Evolutionary dynamics of the port hazardous chemical logistics enterprises' security behavior under dynamic punishment. In: Gong, D.; Zhu, H., and Liu, R.(eds.), Selected Topics in Coastal Research: Engineering, Industry, Economy, and Sustainable Development. Journal of Coastal Research, Special Issue No. 94, pp. 437–442. Coconut Creek (Florida), ISSN 0749-0208.

In order to investigate the influence on the port hazardous chemical logistics enterprises supervision, this paper analyzes the costs and benefits of different strategies of the port hazardous chemical logistics enterprises and the government, and establishes an evolutionary game model between the port hazardous chemical logistics enterprises and the government on the basis of evolutionary game theory. Then the dynamic adjustment mechanism was put forward on the basis of static punishment and it was proved that the mechanism could effectively control the fluctuation in the evolutionary process. The results show that: the dynamic punishment coefficient optimization measures is effective, to increase the proportion of the port hazardous chemical logistics enterprises that adopt a paying attention to safety investment strategy, appropriate subsidies and supervision cost optimization are effective promotion manners. For groups of the smaller port hazardous chemical logistics enterprises, the government should pay more attention to their safety investment behavior.