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23 June 2020 Long-term Hydropower Pricing in the Spot Market with Evolutionary Game Theory
Liling Lin, Chaorong Huang, Linfeng Zhao
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Abstract

Lin, L.; Huang, C., and Zhao, L., 2020. Long-term hydropower pricing in the spot market with evolutionary game theory. In: Yang, Y.; Mi, C.; Zhao, L., and Lam, S. (eds.), Global Topics and New Trends in Coastal Research: Port, Coastal and Ocean Engineering. Journal of Coastal Research, Special Issue No. 103, pp. 117–119. Coconut Creek (Florida), ISSN 0749-0208.

At present, the development of hydropower market in most countries and regions are still at the initial stage, and existing laws and regulations are not adequate enough. The hydropower market is still in the dynamic evolution and development. This paper carried out the evolutionary game analysis of the hydropower market and compared the payoff matrix of power producers when there is a serious power supply shortage. It is found that PAB (pay as bid) settlement is conducive to the stability of power price. When power supply exceeds demand, the on-grid price under MCP (market clearing price) will be lower than that under PAB, which stabilizes and balances development of power market.

©Coastal Education and Research Foundation, Inc. 2020
Liling Lin, Chaorong Huang, and Linfeng Zhao "Long-term Hydropower Pricing in the Spot Market with Evolutionary Game Theory," Journal of Coastal Research 103(sp1), 117-119, (23 June 2020). https://doi.org/10.2112/SI103-024.1
Received: 14 October 2019; Accepted: 26 February 2020; Published: 23 June 2020
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