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Despite extraordinary improvements in medicine, health care worldwide continues to exhibit indefensible contradictions and extreme inequalities. “Health-for-all” campaigns, and development programs targeting welfare and social security have addressed these problems with limited success, but bioethicists, who by this point in the globalization era might have been expected to be addressing these problems urgently and persistently, have had little to say. We ask if bioethics, stalled at a crossroads, is prepared to alter course. We review the bioethics experience in Turkey as a case study, considering especially globalization and Turkey's application to join the European Union.
Since 1998, and especially since the “Amerithrax” emergency of 2001, the United States has ambitiously funded biodefense projects, intending not only to enhance detection and management of any biological-weapons attack but also to establish a robust domestic biodefense industry. I asked if the United States had fulfilled this latter intention. Using the RAND Corporation's RaDiUS database, I examined federal biodefense grants and contracts awarded from 1995 through most of 2005, noting recipient type, awarding unit, funding level, and the disease focus of research-and-development support. Patterns in these data as well as other sources suggest that the biodefense industry as late as 2005 remained in a nascent stage, with most firms small, precariously financed, and more responsive to funders' announcements and solicitations than to opportunities for self-directed innovation. A biodefense industry with investor-capital funding and retained earnings, with its own leading companies, with its own stock analysts, and with its own legitimacy in commercial and financial markets did not emerge over the period studied, nor does its emergence appear imminent.
In intelligence investigations, such as those into reports of chemical- or biological-weapons (CBW) use, evidence may be difficult to assemble and, once assembled, to weigh. We propose a methodology for such investigations and then apply it to a large body of recently declassified evidence to determine the extent to which an attribution can now be made in the Yellow Rain case. Our analysis strongly supports the hypothesis that CBW were used in Southeast Asia and Afghanistan in the late 1970s and early 1980s, although a definitive judgment cannot be made. The proposed methodology, while resource-intensive, allows evidence to be assembled and analyzed in a transparent manner so that assumptions and rationale for decisions can be challenged by external critics. We conclude with a discussion of future research directions, emphasizing the use of evolving information-extraction (IE) technologies, a sub-field of artificial intelligence (AI).
This analysis seeks to identify factors that may shape the policy stance — whether restrictive or permissive — that each state in the United States with a human cloning law in place takes toward human therapeutic cloning. The investigation also considers if cloning policy is more the product of morality politics or political economy. Results show that among states with human cloning policies in place, those with a greater biotechnological capacity, more permissive abortion laws, fewer Evangelical Protestants, and higher political liberalism rankings are more likely to have permissive cloning laws. A higher Roman Catholic population is strongly associated with permissive cloning laws, rather than restrictive cloning laws as originally supposed. Factors with morality policy and economic bases were both found to be associated with cloning policy outcomes. Results suggest that morality policies, though distinct in some ways, do share determinants with public policies based on political economy.
Often since the early 1990s, feminist evolutionists have criticized evolutionary psychologists, finding fault in their analyses of human male and female reproductive behavior. Feminist evolutionists have criticized various evolutionary psychologists for perpetuating gender stereotypes, using questionable methodology, and exhibiting a chill toward feminism. Though these criticisms have been raised many times, the conflict itself has not been fully analyzed. Therefore, I reconsider this conflict, both in its origins and its implications. I find that the approaches and perspectives of feminist evolutionists and evolutionary psychologists are distinctly different, leading many of the former to work in behavioral ecology, primatology, and evolutionary biology. Invitingly to feminist evolutionists, these three fields emphasize social behavior and the influences of environmental variables; in contrast, evolutionary psychology has come to rely on assumptions deemphasizing the pliability of psychological mechanisms and the flexibility of human behavior. In behavioral ecology, primatology, and evolutionary biology, feminist evolutionists have found old biases easy to correct and new hypotheses practical to test, offering new insights into male and female behavior, explaining the emergence and persistence of patriarchy, and potentially bringing closer a prime feminist goal, sexual equality.