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This article provides a survey of the economic literature on investment behaviour and capacity adjustment in fisheries. An overview of the existing theoretical and the empirical work is provided, and areas that require more work are pointed out. The survey shows that while a large body of theoretical work has been developed on the issue of capital adjustment in fisheries, relatively less attention has been granted to the theory of investment, where this becomes a separate decision to the decision about capital levels; i.e., where capital is quasi-malleable. In addition, empirical studies have been fairly limited, and more work is still needed to analyse and further investigate these issues in practical situations. There is particularly a need for more empirical studies of investment behaviour and drivers of investment behaviour at the firm level based on adequate economic data.
To ensure the long-term conservation and sustainable use of straddling fish stocks, the 1995 United Nations Fish Stock Agreement calls for the establishment of regional fisheries management organizations to manage them. This article studies the potential for cooperation in straddling stock fisheries when the cooperative coalition of countries acts as a Stackelberg leader against the remaining singleton countries. Within the Stackelberg fishing game with several interested parties, the result shows that an increase in the cooperation level leads to an increase not only in the steady-state fish stock, but also in the total rent of the fishery. Further, the outlook for cooperation is better within the Stackelberg game, where the cooperative coalition acts as a leader, than in the Cournot game. At the stable equilibrium of a Stackelberg game, not only is the steady-state fish stock higher, but also the total resource rent, participants' rent, and non-participants' rent are higher than those of the Cournot-Nash stable equilibrium. The new-entrant issue is a problem for the conservation of fish stock in the Stackelberg game. Self-financed transfers with commitments of the initial stable coalition will increase the level of cooperation. The theoretical findings are illustrated by a numerical example of how to reach stable full cooperation and used to indicate possible ways forward for the South China Sea fisheries.
Sales and distribution innovations have increased productivity in the salmon aquaculture industry. In this article, we investigate the use of fixed price contracts for Norwegian salmon exports to France based on all export transactions between the two countries. Our analysis shows that almost 25% of these exports were traded using fixed price contracts and contract prices were renegotiated at different intervals, including as infrequently as once a year. Some contracts allow the contracting parties to adjust contract prices when the export price moves significantly. Benchmark analysis, which shows a marginal 0.5% difference between average unit revenue for the year from spot sales relative to contract sales, indicates that contracts primarily change revenue time profiles. The use of contracts creates a wedge between salmon export prices and spot prices in periods of price volatility, which in turn reduces price transmission.
Fresh water springs are unique natural resources that are contained within public lands across the United States. Natural resource management on public lands generates many interesting policy issues as the competing goals of conservation, recreational opportunity provision, and revenue generation often clash. As demand for recreational cave diving sites increases, this article provides natural resource site managers with the first statistical estimate of divers' willingness to pay (WTP) to dive cave and cavern systems. Using a contingent valuation model (CVM) and correcting for hypothetical bias, we find that divers' median WTP for cave diving opportunities at the site of interest is between $52 and $83 per dive. Model results also provide weak evidence of diver sensitivity with respect to scope, as individuals are willing to pay more for dives that are judged to be higher in quality.